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Abstract. Catholic evolutionists have proposed to reconcile evolutionary anthropo-
genesis with Catholic doctrine by suggesting that a created soul could be infused into 
a body produced (in part, if not wholly) by evolution from an animal body. Could such 
an infusion yield not just a Platonic composite but a being with the unity of substance 
required by a Thomistic philosophy of nature? How could such a soul be the form of 
the body into which it was infused?
This paper suggests that animals seem to have sense-powers with a level of com-
plexity, if not sufficient to underlie the abstraction of concepts in a being that also has 
a rational soul, then at least nearly so. The burden of proof lies rather on those who 
think that evolutionary development of such powers is not possible.
In its final section, the paper argues that the existence of Eve as a second, and the 
only additional, initial rational being does not create special problems for the view 
here articulated.
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Introduction
The idea that man has an animal ancestry predates Charles Darwin’s evo-
lutionary ideas by a half-century. It was explicitly articulated in both of the 
major works of early nineteenth-century evolutionism—Jean-Baptiste de 
Lamarck’s Philosophie Zoologique (1809) and Robert Chambers’ Vestiges of the 
Natural History of Creation (1844). Darwin made only three passing references 
to human origins in On the Origin of Species (1859),1 but the implication of 
animal origins was there and no one missed it. Oxford’s Anglican bishop 
Samuel Wilberforce, in an (anonymous) review of the Origin, wrote that “if 
Mr. Darwin can […] demonstrate to us our fungular descent, we shall dismiss 
our pride, and avow, with the characteristic humility of philosophy, our 
unsuspected cousinship with the mushrooms” (1860,121). By the time Darwin 
published The Descent of Man in 1871, three more books explicitly defending 
evolutionary anthropogenesis had already been published—Thomas Henry 
Huxley’s Evidences as to Man’s Place in Nature (1863); Carl Vogt’s Vorlesungen 
über den Menschen: Seine Stellung in der Schöpfung und in der Geschichte der 
Erde (1863), an English translation of which (as Lectures on Man: His Place 
in Creation and in the History of the Earth) was published the following year; 
and Giovanni Canestrini’s Origine dell’uomo (1866).
Although many Catholics, evolutionist and anti-evolutionist alike, 
denied that theories of evolutionary phytogenesis or zoögenesis, whether 
true or false, have any theological significance,2 the same was surely not 
true of the question of whether evolutionary processes played a role in 
anthropogenesis. 
1 In the final chapter of On the Origin of Species he wrote: “Light will be thrown on the origin 
of man and his history” (1859, 488). He had already hinted at this earlier in the book—“All 
vertebrate animals having true lungs have descended by ordinary generation from an an-
cient prototype” (1859, 191). The final chapter makes a stronger claim: “I should infer 
from analogy that probably all the organic beings which have ever lived on this earth have 
descended from some one primordial form, into which life was first breathed” (1859, 484). 
2 To cite just one example, Oratorian priest Pierre-Julien Hamard wrote in his article for 
the Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique that “The Bible grants equal freedom to 
transformists and to the defenders of successive creations. […] Whenever it is not abso-
lutely explicit, […] anyone who invokes its authority puts at risk both the Bible itself and 
the religious cause of which it is the support” (1889, 3093).
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1. Historical Background
1.1 Catholic Objections to Evolutionary Anthropogenesis
The first official Catholic notice of the idea of evolutionary anthropogenesis 
came at a provincial council held in Cologne in the spring of 1860. In the 
context of a much more general review of Catholic doctrine on points 
ranging from the Trinity to the theology of nature, it declared that “Our 
first parents were made [conditi] immediately by God. Therefore, clearly 
opposed to Sacred Scripture and to faith is the opinion […] that man, even 
considering only his body, was brought forth by the spontaneous change 
[immutatio] of a less perfect nature into a more perfect one in a way that 
is continuous and culminates in a human nature” (Cologne, 1860, I.IV.14 
(= col. 292)). Although one might think that, coming the year after the 
publication of Darwin’s Origin, the Council’s statement was responding 
to that book, there are good reasons for thinking that that is historically 
incorrect. First, Heinrich Georg Bronn’s German translation of the Origin 
was only being published as the Council met.3 Second, that translation, as 
its very title (Über die Entstehung der Arten im Thier- und Pflanzenreich …) 
shows, minimized the relevance of the book to anthropogenesis. Finally, 
there is a more likely target—Chambers’ Vestiges, Vogt’s German translation 
of which had been published in 1851 with a second edition released in 1858. 
Chambers (1844, 326; Vogt, 1858, 276)4 seems to have suggested precisely 
the kind of mixed (evolutionary-creationist) account of anthropogenesis 
rejected by the Council. I will return to Chambers’ ideas below.
Whether the doctrine articulated at Cologne precludes any evolutionary 
account of the origin of the human body, as some Catholic anti-evolution-
ists have been insisting now for 160 years, or whether it is more narrowly 
focused on continuist, non-providentialist, and non-exceptionalist versions 
of evolutionary anthropogenesis, is a question that we can set aside here. 
A comprehensive rejection of any form of such anthropogenesis surely was 
3 The Council met from 29 April to 17 May 1860. Heinrich Georg Bronn’s translation came 
out in three parts—on 4 April, 2 May, and 11 June 1860 (Börsenblatt 1860).
4 Vogt translated the sixth edition, but that does not affect the relevant passage.
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the view of many Catholic theologians. Early on, some theologians claimed 
that the evolutionary view was heretical;5 by the turn of the century, the 
more common evaluation was that the idea was merely rash.6
What concerns did Catholic anti-evolutionists have about evolutionary 
anthropogenesis? Surely part of the problem was created by the fact that 
evolutionary ideas generally kept bad company—Karl Vogt, Thomas Henry 
Huxley, Clémence Royer (Darwin’s first French translator), and Ernst Haeckel 
(Darwin’s most prominent German promoter) divided their time between 
arguing for evolution and denying traditional Christian theological doctrines.
There were, however, also more focused theological concerns. First, 
Catholic anti-evolutionists were generally insistent that evolutionary 
anthropogenesis was in ineliminable tension with the text of Holy Scripture 
and with the interpretation of the relevant passages of Scripture found 
in the Fathers. To be sure, St. Augustine had cautioned against excessive 
anthropomorphism in the reading of the very text at the center of the 
controversy:
To think that God molded [finxit7] man from the slime of the earth with bodily 
hands is childish. […] Anyone in his right mind understands that the name of 
a bodily member [in passages in which one is found] is used for the power and 
5 Matthias Joseph Scheeben (1873–1887, II:144) wrote: “It would already be heretical if one 
hypothesized only a bodily ‘descent of man from the apes’ on the way to a gradual trans-
mutation of forms, even if one added divine creation of the soul on completion of the 
transmutation.”
6 Erich Wasmann, S.J., (1906, 443) wrote that “God could make use of matter previously 
prepared by natural causes […] we may assume to be possible”, but added in a footnote 
that a great majority of theologians still held to the union of the human soul with a body 
formed from inorganic matter “in light of a constant tradition and the statements of the 
ordinary magisterium” and that “theologians cannot be faulted for retaining the literal 
interpretation […] until the other side offers satisfactory evidence that the text should be in-
terpreted differently” (1906, 444, emphasis added). That italicized phrase captures precise-
ly the technical theological conception of rashness. (Translations mine; for the published 
translation, see 1923, 436–7.) See also Buonpensiere, 1898, 40–41.
John Cuthbert Hedley (1898) (then a Benedictine priest, but later Bishop of Newport 
(Wales)) gave a cautiously sympathetic review of Zahm’s Evolution and Dogma.
7 Augustine was evidently looking at the Vetus Latina translation, which uses finxerit where 
the Vulgate has formavit.
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might of God. […] Man’s pre-eminence lies […] in the fact that God made him 
to His own image. (415, 6.12.20–21)
One should not, said St. Augustine, take finxit, a word that has a strong 
connotation of working with one’s hands, so literally. Catholic evolutionists 
thought the same thing about limus (slime). They might have said
To think of God as making man directly from the slime of the earth underes-
timates the reach of secondary causes. […] Anyone who is knowledgeable of 
the facts uncovered by modern science would see that the phrase “slime of the 
earth” has been used in this passage to mean matter generally.
Catholic anti-evolutionists may not have demanded literal slime, but they 
were certain that the word excluded animal bodies. This hermeneutical 
question will not be explored further here.
A second concern was that Adam’s descent from animals seemed to 
offend against the dignity of man. In what is perhaps the last major work 
of Catholic anti-evolutionism, Ernesto Cardinal Ruffini wrote, “Who will be 
ready to believe that Adam had for his father and mother two brute beasts? 
Although innocent and holy, he would certainly have been in a much less 
honorable condition than is ours” ([1948] 1959, 139). This persistent concern 
received an early reply from Filippo De Filippi (whom I will introduce later). 
In an appendix to the published version of his 1864 lecture “L’Uomo e le 
scimie,” he wrote: “To think that the origin of man is perhaps less divine 
when the Biblical clod of earth turns out to be the entire organic world is 
a strange way of understanding human dignity” (1865, 69).
Some Catholics articulated a third concern, which the Jesuit philosopher 
Charles Boyer expressed as follows: “Let us suppose that some animals 
have reached the limits of the sensible order. I say: they would not be able 
to generate [donner origine] a human body” (1952, 204) and “Only bodies 
animated by an intellectual [spirituel] soul can engender bodies capable 
of being animated by an intellectual [spirituel] soul” (1952, 205). It is this 
philosophical objection that will be the particular focus of this paper.
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1.2. Catholic Openness to Evolutionary Anthropogenesis
Not all Catholics shared the views articulated at Cologne, however. St. John 
Henry Newman, for example, wrote in his notebooks:
it is as strange that monkeys should be so like men, with no historical connexion 
between them, as […] the notion that there was no course of facts by which 
fossil bones got into rocks. […] I will either go the whole hog with Darwin, or, 
dispensing with time & history altogether, hold, not only the theory of distinct 
species but that also of the creation of fossil-bearing rocks. (1969-1970, 158)
Catholic philosophers, scientists and theologians—from de Filippi and 
St. George Mivart through Zeferino Cardinal González, Dalmas Leroy and 
John Zahm to Henry de Dorlodot and Ernest Messenger—over the course 
of the next eighty years offered defenses, if not in every case of the fact of 
evolutionary processes playing a role in the formation of the first human 
body, then at least of the compatibility of that idea with Catholic theology. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, two Catholic alternatives to the view 
that God formed Adam’s body from the slime of the earth, or (in a more 
polite version) from dust—in any case from עפר ʿafar—had emerged.
2. Outline of the Task: Constraints on a Catholic Evolutionism
To answer the question of whether it is possible to integrate the idea of an 
evolutionary origin of the human body into a more comprehensive Catholic 
account of anthropogenesis we must begin by exploring some background 
considerations, constraints that an acceptable solution must satisfy. What 
evolutionary processes are (according the best scientific evidence) available? 
What kind of being (according to Catholic anthropology) do they have to 
produce?
2.1. Evolutionary Processes
The transformative processes in question would be the genetic mutations 
that effect something new in an individual animal and a process (such as 
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natural or sexual selection, or the founder effect) that spreads this change 
through an entire population.8 That the mutations would be biologically 
random does not preclude its subsumption under Divine Providence.
To these processes, one can, of course, add what Darwin called the 
Correlation of Growth, a kind of accidental selection:
the whole organisation is so tied together during its growth and development, 
that when slight variations in any one part occur, and are accumulated through 
natural selection, other parts become modified. (1859, 143)
there are many unknown laws of correlation of growth, which, when one part 
of the organisation is modified through variation, and the modifications are 
accumulated by natural selection for the good of the being, will cause other 
modifications, often of the most unexpected nature. (1859, 85–86)
2.2. Catholic Anthropology
What doctrines must an account of evolutionary anthropogenesis accom-
modate if it is to remain consistent with Catholic theology?
The first doctrine is that man is a composite of a material body and 
a rational soul which is “truly in itself and essentially the form of the human 
body.” That doctrine was articulated at the Council of Vienne (1312), and 
again at Lateran V (1513).9 Although Catholic anthropology is quite explicitly 
non-materialist, it is also opposed to the dualism that is a central feature 
of Platonism. Not only is the soul not a prisoner in a corporeal prison, it 
is not even the pilot of a ship or (though Gilbert Ryle’s image is perhaps 
vaguer) a ghost in a machine (1949, 22). St. Gregory of Nyssa, in objection 
to the idea of the transmigration of souls, wrote that:
8 As an historical matter, we might bear in mind that many Catholic evolutionists, in the 
first half-century of the Catholic discussion of this question, would have identified the 
operative processes as some internal factor, a component of a broader orthogenetic the-
ory. Here I will focus rather on the random mutations and selective filters that play the 
predominant role in evolutionary change according to current evolutionary theory.
9 See also de Dorlodot, 1903.
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Some people think that one and the same soul becomes successively that of 
a man and that of an irrational being, changing bodies and forever passing, as 
it pleases, from one to another—from man to bird, or to fish, or to beast, and 
then back to man. Some people extend this nonsense even to bushes. […] Those 
who think that that soul migrates from one species to another […] neglect to 
make a distinction among the distinctive features of the various species, mixing 
everything with everything else—the irrational and the rational, the sensible 
and the insensible. […] To say that one and the same soul, now rational and 
intellectual because it has our kind of body, could then lie in a hole with the 
snakes, or flock with the birds, or […] live underwater, or become something not 
even capable of sensation […] is nothing other than to think that everything 
has the same nature. (380, PG 108–9)
What are the implications of that doctrine for our question? 
Ernest Messenger, the Catholic priest who wrote the most comprehensive 
theological defense of Catholic evolutionism, cited a Scholastic formula 
(which he attributed to St. Gregory of Nyssa) that “the nature of the soul 
is always proportional to the body.” Messenger put the point as follows: 
“the human soul […] cannot inform a body which is not human, that is, one 
which does not possess what is essential for a human organism, or more 
particularly, one which does not possess the organs which are the essential 
seat of the higher organic faculties, or which does not possess the specific 
organization peculiar to these organs” (1932, 87).
The second doctrine, that every individual human soul (and a fortiori the 
first) was directly created by God, was the prevailing view among Catholic 
theologians. The question of whether to define the creation of human souls 
as Catholic doctrine had been raised at Vatican I in response to the traducian 
alternative that had been advanced by Jakob Frohschammer and Bl. Antonio 
de Rosmini-Serbati earlier in the century.10 The proposal met with some 
resistance11 and the matter had not been resolved before the fall of Rome 
10 Frohschammer 1854 and Rosmini-Serbati 1858, §§647–659. Frohschammer’s book was 
placed on the Index of Prohibited Books in 1857. Rosmini’s work was reviewed by the Holy 
Office in 1854, but no formal censure of his view was then made.
11 There is a long note explaining why the commission did not include the idea that the soul 
was directly created by God in one of the schemata prepared at the First Vatican Council 
(1869).
8(2)/2020 147
G O D, E VO L U T I O N, A N D T H E B O DY O F A DA M
and the prorogation of the Council. Nevertheless, the creation of the soul 
was accepted by Catholic evolutionists and anti-evolutionists alike and 
played no role in Catholic controversy over evolution and anthropogenesis. 
The question of the origin of the human body was standardly treated as 
a distinct question in theology textbooks addressing the topic of creation.
The third doctrine is that human beings and animals are different not 
just in degree, but in kind. There is, to use the words of St. John Paul II, an 
“ontological discontinuity” between the two. As signs of distinctively human 
being, he mentions “metaphysical knowledge, self-consciousness, moral con-
science, freedom, and aesthetic and religious experience.” These signs, John 
Paul went on to say, must be subjected to philosophical analysis (1996, para. 6). 
At their root, on the traditional Catholic analysis, is rationality—the powers of 
intellect and will, and their acts (on the speculative side: concept-formation, 
judgment, and inference; and on the practical side: intention and choice).
The idea that man can apprehend concepts as well as perceptual images 
while animals, by contrast, cannot can be illustrated by three examples. 
J. R. R. Tolkien put it this way: “The human mind […] sees not only green-
grass, discriminating it from other things […], but sees that it is green as well 
as being grass” (1966, 22). René Descartes illustrated the human faculty of 
conceptualization (in contrast to the imagination which is to some extent 
within the reach of animals) this way in Meditation Six: “When I imagine 
a triangle I don’t merely understand that it is a three-sided figure, but I also 
see the three lines with my mind’s eye as if they were present to me; […] 
if I think of a chiliagon, although I understand quite well that it is a figure 
with a thousand sides, I don’t imagine the thousand sides or see them as if 
they were present to me” (1641 [1931], 185–6). Finally, a few months ago, 
the Congo’s Virunga National Park posted an amusing picture of two gorillas 
imitating the posture of one of the park’s rangers. Innocent Mburanumwe, 
deputy director of the park, explained the behavior by saying that, since 
the gorillas had been raised by the rangers, “they are considering that those 
rangers are their parents” (Bever 2019). It was a reasonable explanation, 
but, of course, no one thinks that gorillas really have the concept “parent,” 
something of which they recognize other instances.
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3. Three Versions of Anthropogenesis
I said a moment ago that two Catholic versions of evolutionary anthropo-
genesis had emerged by the end of the nineteenth century. Adding those to 
the ordinary version, we can distinguish three families of theories.
3.1. Family № 1: The Darwin-Chambers Family
The first family encompasses theories in which evolutionary processes are 
sufficient to account for the origin of the human race. There are important 
differences between the evolutionary views of Robert Chambers and Charles 
Darwin, but they share the idea that evolutionary processes of the kind 
that gave rise to new species of plants and animals were fully capable of 
producing human beings from other animal species. These accounts of 
man and his origins are inconsistent with Catholic doctrine on two points.
The first point of contradiction is the body-soul composition of the 
human person. Darwin, following his usual practice of avoiding theological 
and metaphysical questions, seldom used the word “soul.” Near the end of 
The Descent of Man, however, he acknowledged that “He who believes in the 
advancement of man from some low organised form, will naturally ask how 
does this bear on the belief in the immortality of the soul” (1871, 2:395).12 
He contented himself, however, in his reply, with denying that there is 
anything particularly irreligious about his theory and did not address the 
question of the existence of human souls.
Chambers, some years earlier, had addressed the question, writing:
There is, in reality, nothing to prevent our regarding man as specially endowed 
with an immortal spirit, at the same time that his ordinary mental manifestations 
are looked upon as simple phenomena resulting from organization, those of 
the lower animals being phenomena absolutely the same in character, though 
developed within much narrower limits. (1844, 326)
12 Darwin used the word “soul” only a few times in The Descent of Man, and only in this one 
passage in a way relevant to our topic.
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So, according to Chambers, souls there may be, though not the kind of souls 
that constitute the ground of distinctively human powers. Chambersian 
souls, not being the form of the human body, are less than what is required 
by Catholic doctrine.
The second point of contradiction is on the question of human exception-
alism. In The Descent of Man, Darwin said “there is no fundamental difference 
between man and the higher mammals in their mental faculties” (1871, 
1:35). Anti-exceptionalism, if not essential to Darwin’s scientific project 
(the defense of common ancestry and natural selection),13 was important 
to many Darwinists’ philosophical project. The importance of this thesis to 
the larger (i.e., extra-scientific) project of many evolutionists is suggested 
by two comments of Stephen Jay Gould on the difference between Darwin 
and Alfred Russel Wallace with respect to the origin of the human race: “If 
Darwin had been distressed by his failure to impress Wallace with sexual 
selection, he was now positively aghast at Wallace’s abrupt about-face at 
the finish line itself” and “[Wallace] abandon[ed natural selection] at the 
most crucial moment of all” (1980, 53). What could it mean to call the purely 
evolutionary origin of man, rather than, say, “the truth about the origin of 
man,” “the finish line”? 
The thesis of endowed immortal spirits might appear to make Chambers’ 
view an exceptionalist one, but it does so only at the cost of introducing 
a dualism inconsistent with the doctrine of Vienne. Chambers is quite clear 
(if not always entirely consistent) in asserting that, with respect to human 
powers (including mental powers), there is no difference in kind between 
man and animal:
The difference between mind in the lower animals and in man is a difference 
in degree only; it is not a specific difference. (1844, 335)
The grades of mind […] are mere stages of development. In the humbler forms, 
but a few of the mental faculties are traceable. […] In man the system has arrived 
at its highest condition. (1844, 347)
13 If animals had plants as ancestors (despite the difference in kind between the two king-
doms), why could human not have animal ancestors?
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So, the “immortal spirit,” if it exists, seems at best to be something merely 
inserted into the human body, without itself giving that body any of the 
powers that are part of human nature.
3.2. Family № 2: The DeFilippi-Mivart Family
Catholic evolutionists were explicitly exceptionalist. Catholic evolutionism 
could also easily accommodate the second of the doctrines mentioned 
above, the direct creation of each human soul. How that creationism (about 
the soul) can be combined with the first doctrine (the human person as 
a hylomorphic composite of body and soul), however, requires careful con-
sideration. The infusion of a created rational soul into a body which evolved 
from animal ancestors might raise no problems for a Platonist, but would 
it not be, in the words of St. Gregory of Nyssa, “a soul adapted to a strange 
building” (379, 29.7)? Could a Catholic accept the combination of evolution 
and infusion? Could a Thomist? Some Catholics thought that they could. 
Two Catholic biologists, Filippo De Filippi and St.-George Jackson Mivart, 
articulated a version of anthropogenesis combining an evolved human body 
with a soul that is the locus of distinctively human powers in a way that it 
is not for Chambers.
De Filippi (1814–1867) was one of the leading Italian naturalists of his 
day. His research ranged from parasitic worms and the embryology of fish 
to paleontology and mineralogy.14 Professor of zoölogy and director of the 
zoölogical museum at the University of Turin, he also found time for both 
popular science writing and for reflection on the relationship between sci-
ence and religion. He was a sincere and practicing Catholic. His 1864 lecture 
“L’Uomo e le scimie” did much to launch the debate over Darwinism in Italy.
Mivart was an English anatomist and systematic zoölogist. Originally 
a student of Huxley and a member of the Darwin circle, he gradually devel-
oped an evolutionism of his own. His view was, of course, controversial, but 
not so much so as to prevent Henry Cardinal Manning from recommending 
14 For a bibliography, see Moleschott 1866–67, 444–453.
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that Mivart receive an honorary doctorate from the Vatican. That recom-
mendation was accepted by Pope Pius IX, and the degree awarded, in 1876.
Both de Filippi and Mivart were evolutionists in the sense that they 
accepted the idea that the origin of species lies in the transformation of 
other species. They differed, however, on one scientific point. De Filippi 
accepted a prominent role for natural selection;15 Mivart, by contrast, did 
not, attributing evolutionary development rather to “natural laws, for the 
most part as yet unknown” (1871, 305). That difference is not, however, 
important for our purposes.
This account of anthropogenesis was most explicitly presented by 
Mivart in his On the Genesis of Species in 1871. Its key idea is the evolution 
of a suitable body followed by the infusion of a created soul:
Scripture […] says that “God made man from the dust of the earth, and breathed 
into his nostrils the breath of life.” This is a plain and direct statement that 
man’s body […] was evolved from preëxisting material (symbolized by the term 
“dust of the earth”), and was therefore [formed] by the operation of secondary 
laws. (1871, 300)
The soul of every individual man is […] created […] produced by a direct or 
supernatural act, and, of course, […] by such an act the soul of the first man 
was similarly created. (1871, 295)
The contrast with Chambers becomes more explicit in a passage in which 
Mivart wrote:
We find a perfect harmony in the double nature of man, his rationality making 
use of and subsuming his animality; his soul arising from direct and immediate 
creation, and his body being formed at first (as now in each separate individual) 
by derivative or secondary creation, through natural laws. By such secondary 
creation […] all the various kinds of animals and plants have been manifested 
on this planet. (1871, 287)
15 On natural selection, see in particular de Filippi 1864, 12 and 59–60. On common ances-
try, to pick just two passages, pages 43 and 51. (Citations other than those to the Appen-
dix, will be to this 1864 edition.)
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Chambers can say no more than that a soul is inserted into a human body; 
for Mivart, a soul is infused into a body. It is not merely an endowment but 
a substantial form.
There is no doubt that Mivart was an exceptionalist, but de Filippi, less 
explicit about infusion, was particularly explicit about exceptionalism. Let 
us begin with his point that “to say that man is descended from an ape 
[scimia] is to do no more than to express an anatomical fact” (1864, 42). It 
is perhaps too easy to read his statement with an emphasis on the word 
“fact.” It would express his larger view equally well (perhaps better) if the 
emphasis were put rather on the word “anatomical.” De Filippi’s second 
point, and in his view one even more important than the first, was that there 
is more to man than anatomy. The correspondences between man and ape 
with respect to structure are of less significance than the differences at the 
level of instinct and intellect.
The more we reduce the physical inequalities between man and ape, the more 
the inequalities that remain, the differences in powers [differenze virtuali], grow 
in importance […] The place of man in nature must be determined not by the 
more or less of morphological characteristics subject to variation within the 
narrow confines of a species but by comparison of the powers proper to man 
with those of animals. (1864, 45–46)
De Filippi emphasized those differences:
The naturalist who thinks he can resolve the question of whether the difference 
between instinct and reason, or between animal and human reasoning, by 
asserting that man and animal have the same power [principio virtuale], or 
that there is nothing in one that is not in the other, will see common sense 
advancing against him like a heavy phalanx, and will have to cede the field of 
battle. (1864, 47)
The differences that everyone recognizes, he said, are sufficient to justify the 
establishment of a separate human kingdom, alongside those of minerals, 
plants, and animals: “The legitimacy of that kingdom cannot be disputed. 
Those who accept it and those who reject it both confirm it: […] for of all of 
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man’s distinctive attributes, two are the most certain: one is that of putting 
himself in question and the other is the struggle with his own feelings” 
(1864, 50). The coat of arms of the human kingdom, he said in the last words 
of his lecture, contains the double crown of the moral and the teleological 
order (1864, 53).16
3.3. Family № 3: The Wallace-González Family
We must also, however, distinguish a third view, not as fully evolutionary 
even as the de Filippi-Mivart view. On this view, the human body is partially, 
but only partially, the product of evolutionary processes. That view was 
elaborated in one way by (the non-Catholic) Alfred Russel Wallace and in 
another by Zeferino Cardinal González (1831-1894).
Wallace, co-discoverer of the principle of natural selection, differed with 
Darwin in several respects. First, Darwin was not as absolute a selectionist 
as was Wallace. In the last words of the introduction to the Origin of Species, 
he had written, “I am convinced that Natural Selection has been the main 
but not exclusive means of modification.”17 Wallace thought that natural 
selection “ha[d] probably sufficed to produce all the varieties of structure, 
all the wonderful adaptations, all the beauty of form and of colour, that we 
see in the animal and vegetable kingdoms” (1870, 332).
In 1869–70, in an anonymous review of the tenth edition of Charles 
Lyell’s seminal Principles of Geology, Wallace indicated a second difference. 
He argued, briefly there, and later in more detail in “The Limits of Natural 
Selection as Applied to Man,” the final chapter of his Contributions to the 
Theory of Natural Selection, that natural selection was not sufficient to 
16 The teleological order to which he referred is an extrinsic teleology, the suitability of the 
planet for human life.
17 Italics mine. See also Darwin’s comment in the conclusion of the sixth and final edition 
of the Origin: “as my conclusions have lately been much misrepresented, and it has been 
stated that I attribute the modification of species exclusively to natural selection, I may 
be permitted to remark that in the first edition of this work, and subsequently, I placed 
in a most conspicuous position—namely, at the close of the Introduction—the following 
words: ‘I am convinced that natural selection has been the main but not the exclusive 
means of modification’” (1872, 421).
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produce several important human features.18 With respect to the mind, 
he wrote: “[Primitive peoples] possess a mental organ beyond their needs. 
Natural Selection could only have endowed savage man19 with a brain 
a little superior to that of an ape, whereas he actually possesses one very 
little inferior to that of a philosopher” (1870, 356). What are those human 
faculties “of no possible use to man in his early stages” and thus beyond the 
reach of natural selection? Wallace mentioned “the capacity to form ideal 
conceptions of space and time, of eternity and infinity […] [and] abstract 
notions of form and number which render geometry and arithmetic possible” 
(1870, 351). He then asked:
How could “natural selection,” or survival of the fittest in the struggle for 
existence, at all favour the development of mental powers so entirely removed 
from the material necessities of savage men, and which even now, with our 
comparatively high civilization, are, in their farthest developments, in advance 
of the age, and appear to have relation rather to the future of the race than to 
its actual status? (1870, 352)
In other words,
in his large and well-developed brain [primitive man] possesses an organ quite 
disproportionate to his actual requirements—an organ that seems prepared 
in advance, only to be fully utilized as he progresses in civilization. […] [W]e 
must therefore admit, that the large brain he actually possesses could never 
have been solely developed by any of those laws of evolution, whose essence is, 
that they lead to a degree of organization exactly proportionate to the wants 
of each species, never beyond those wants. (1870, 343)
Darwin contented himself with trying to show that animals had inchoate 
versions of all allegedly distinctive human traits and with emphasizing 
18 In his review of Lyell’s book, he mentioned “the brain, the organs of speech, the hand, and 
the external form of man” (Wallace 1869, 391).
19 It is important to note that by “savages,” Wallace meant primitive or uncivilized peoples, 
the term not yet having been restricted to the pejorative sense characteristic of more 
recent usage.
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the power of sexual selection. This brings us to a third difference between 
Wallace and Darwin. Wallace was a spiritualist and that served him as the 
foundation of an alternative explanation of the origin of the human body: 
“The brain of prehistoric and of savage man seems to me to prove the exis-
tence of some power, distinct from that which has guided the development 
of the lower animals through their ever-varying forms of being” (1879, 343). 
He later called this power “a superior intelligence” and drew an analogy to 
artificial selection: “[it] has guided the development of man in a definite 
direction, and for a special purpose, just as man guides the development 
of many animal and vegetable forms” (1879, 359). This is still, however, 
a “direct[ion of] the action of the laws of variation, multiplication, and 
survival,” not a suspension of them. In his concluding remarks, he added 
that his theory
merely shows, that the laws of organic development have been occasionally 
used for a special end, just as man uses them for his special ends; […] the law 
of “natural selection” can[not] be said to be disproved, if it can be shown that 
man does not owe his entire physical and mental development to its unaided 
action, any more than it is disproved by the existence of the poodle or the pouter 
pigeon, the production of which may have been equally beyond its undirected 
power. (1879, 370)
Wallace also thought that there was a spiritual aspect of human beings, 
though in this he was essentially a dualist:
“spirit” is the essential part of all sensitive beings whose bodies form but the 
machinery and instruments by means of which they perceive and act upon other 
beings and on matter. It is spirit that alone feels, and perceives, and thinks—that 
acquires knowledge and reasons and aspires—though it can only do so by means 
of and in exact proportion to the organisation it is bound up with. It is the spirit 
of man that is man. […] At death it quits the body for ever. (1875, 100–101)
González articulated, though he did not explicitly endorse, a more Catholic 
version of this third line of evolutionary anthropogenesis. Wallace developed 
his version in response to what he perceived to be the scientific problems of 
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what Darwin was about to defend in the Descent of Man; González developed 
his version as a response to Mivart, whose views, though they could not be 
said to be contrary to Catholic doctrine, nevertheless had, González thought, 
grave drawbacks—philosophical, scientific, and exegetical. He proposed 
consideration of an alternative:
juxtaposition of Mivart’s hypothesis with a possibility noted by St. Thomas, 
regarding the possibility that causes or agents other than God intervened in the 
formation of Adam’s body, that is to say, in its preliminary preparation up to 
an imperfect stage of development, reserving the final stages of its preparation 
to receive a rational soul to divine action. In this way, the essence of Mivart’s 
hypothesis is preserved, with due regard to the direct and immediate action 
of God in the formation of the body of the first man, action which traditional 
Biblical exegesis seems to require. (1892, I:514–515)
Although the idea that natural processes could not produce a human body 
might lead (as it had for Wallace) to the search for a preternatural alternative, 
the idea could be based on other grounds. Perhaps God supplemented natural 
processes with direct divine action in the formation of the human body not 
because there was no natural way to produce a human body, but for some 
other reason. After all, He turned water into wine at Cana, not because the 
wine-sellers were out of stock, but because his mother asked him to do so. 
Closer to our subject, the Virgin Birth might be explained as fitting rather 
than absolutely necessary.20 In any case, if, as Catholic anti-evolutionists 
claim, Scripture tells us that God played a direct role in the formation of 
the first human body, then that is what He did, whether we can identify His 
reason for doing so or not. In addition, as Wallace pointed out, to say that 
a superior intelligence played a direct role in the formation of the human 
body is not to say that secondary causes did not play any role at all.
The Wallace-González family is clearly distinct from the views of those 
Catholic (and other) anti-evolutionists who believe that God formed the 
body of Adam directly from the slime of the earth.
20 See Aquinas, 1273, 3a, 28.1, where he argues that Our Lady’s virginity is “fitting,” though 
he does not explicitly deny that it is necessary.
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4. A Catholic Appraisal of the Three Alternatives
Can Filippian-Mivartist views be sustained against the objection raised by 
Boyer? Would the infusion of rational souls into an animal body, like the 
transmigration rejected by St. Gregory, also be a case of putting a rational 
soul into a strange building? If not, can we at least fall back on the alternative 
view of Wallace and González that the human body is partially, but only 
partially, the product of natural processes?
Let us begin with the stronger view. Can evolutionary processes, in 
particular mutation and selection, produce and perpetuate bodies capable 
of laying the perceptual foundations for conceptual thought, i.e., bodies 
into which rational souls can be infused? We can ask, that is to say, whether 
natural processes can get as far as de Filippi and Mivart require that they go.
Two things are clear. First, that one natural process can produce bodies 
with perceptual powers sufficient to underlie rational thought, namely 
human zygosis and embryogenesis. Second, that, the sense-powers of some 
animals being more complex than those of others, evolutionary processes 
must (though I will not defend the point here) be capable of producing 
organisms with comparatively complex internal sense powers from or-
ganisms with comparatively simpler ones—for example, mammals from 
reptiles. If intellectual thought requires a created soul, then the question 
is not whether evolutionary processes can turn a merely perceptual species 
into an intellectual one. It is rather merely whether evolutionary processes 
can turn a species with internal perceptual powers insufficiently complex 
to underlie the abstraction of concepts (earthworms and gnats, if not also 
donkeys and cats) into one whose internal perceptual powers are sufficiently 
complex to allow such abstraction.
Let us abstract from an admittedly more complex reality a linear pro-
gression:
 18 
processes must (though I will not defend the point h re) be c pable f producing organisms with 
comparatively complex internal sense powers from organisms with comparatively simpler ones—
for example, mammals from reptiles. If intellectual thought requires a created soul, then the 
question is not whether evolutionary process s can turn a m rely perceptual species into an 
intellectual one. It is rather merely whether evolutionary processes can turn a species with internal 
perceptual powers insufficiently complex to underlie the abstraction of concepts (earthworms and 
gnats, if not also donkeys and cats) into one whose internal perceptual powers are sufficiently 
complex to allow such abstraction. 
Let us abstract from an admittedly more complex reality a linear progression: 
 
On this continuum, we need to focus on two points—the minimum level of complexity necessary 
for the abstraction of concepts from the percepts (i.e., the minimum level necessary for rational 
thought) and the maximum level of complexity attainable by evolutionary processes. 
 
4.1. The Nature of the Two Points 
 
What is the minimum level of perceptual complexity necessary for the abstraction of concepts? 
Mivart (1876, 189) referred to a “faculty of collecting, grouping, and preserving sensible images 
of objects in complex and coherent aggregations,” which seems about right. To get the concept of 
a triangle, we need to group diverse three-angled figures—equilateral and isosceles, acute and 
obtuse, large and small—and to differentiate them from, say, circles and rhombi. To get the 
concept of a horse, we need to group Bucephalus, Dan Patch, and Clever Hans—the war-horse, 
race-horse, and circus-horse, and to distinguish them from donkeys and zebras. For mammals—
we need to group dogs and horses, opossums and platypodes, and even dolphins and bats, 
differentiating them from sharks and robins. From what would a being without such a faculty be 
able to abstract concepts? What more would a being with such a faculty need? 
What is the maximum level of perceptual complexity which evolutionary processes can 
produce? To see how much complexity those processes have produced, we need to turn to 
ethology. That science of animal behavior has flourished in the last half-century; many ingenious 
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On this continuum, we need to focus on two points—the minimum level 
of complexity necessary for the abstraction of concepts from the percepts 
(i.e., the minimum level necessary for rational thought) and the maximum 
level of complexity attainable by evolutionary processes.
4.1. The Nature of the Two Points
What is the minimum level of perceptual complexity necessary for the ab-
straction of concepts? Mivart (1876, 189) referred to a “faculty of collecting, 
grouping, and preserving sensible images of objects in complex and coherent 
aggregations,” which seems about right. To get the concept of a triangle, we 
need to group diverse three-angled figures—equilateral and isosceles, acute 
and obtuse, large and small—and to differentiate them from, say, circles 
and rhombi. To get the concept of a horse, we need to group Bucephalus, 
Dan Patch, and Clever Hans—the war-horse, race-horse, and circus-horse, 
and to distinguish them from donkeys and zebras. For mammals—we need 
to group dogs and horses, opossums and platypodes, and even dolphins 
and bats, differentiating them from sharks and robins. From what would 
a being without such a faculty be able to abstract concepts? What more 
would a being with such a faculty need?
What is the maximum level of perceptual complexity which evolutionary 
processes can produce? To see how much complexity those processes have 
produced, we need to turn to ethology. That science of animal behavior 
has flourished in the last half-century; many ingenious experiments have 
deepened our understanding of animal cognition. We find capacities that 
lay the foundation for, even though they do not themselves exemplify, 
conceptualization, judgment, and reasoning.
First, there are animal mental capacities that lay the foundation for 
conceptualization. One is the capacity for the comparison and differentiation 
of images. Surely any being with sense powers at all has some ability to 
sort out what it sees. Dogs learn to recognize porcupines and skunks and 
to leave them alone. Dorothy L. Cheney and Robert M. Seyfarth (1990) have 
shown that vervet monkeys distinguish snakes, eagles, and leopards, making 
8(2)/2020 159
G O D, E VO L U T I O N, A N D T H E B O DY O F A DA M
distinct warning calls depending on which is observed. Animals can compare 
an image of what is present to remembered images and act on the basis of 
previous experience. Another is a capacity for the association and grouping 
of images. Ron Schusterman (2002) taught his experimental subjects, sea 
lions, to sort the symbols he showed them into two groups (“numbers” and 
“letters”) and then to assign new symbols to one group or the other on the 
basis of matching-to-sample exercises. The seals were able, that is to say, 
to construct functional equivalence classes, though not, of course, really 
classes that they recognized as numbers and letters. A third is the capacity 
for a kind of abstraction, not of concepts, of course, but a capacity to ignore 
particularities. The determination of numerosity can remain constant despite 
“variation in object features (such as size, color or shape), spatial location, 
modality (auditory or visual) and mode of presentation (simultaneous or 
sequential)” (Dehaene 1998, 356). For example,
a rat trained to press a lever on the left in response to two flashes or two 
sounds, and a lever on the right in response to four flashes or four sounds, 
spontaneously pressed the right lever when presented with a combination of 
two sounds and two lights. The rat’s behavior was based on the abstract total 
number of four events, not on modality-specific representations. (Dehaene 
1998, 357, summarizing Church and Meck 2014)
Second, animals have mental capacities that lay a foundation for judgment. 
They have a capacity for expectation. When a dog chases a cat up a tree, it 
knows that the cat is in the tree, in the sense of having some kind of image 
of that cat in that tree. Many preferential-looking experiments confirm 
that animals associate some of what they see happen with an expectation 
of what will happen next. This can be seen in explorations of what has 
been called number sense (Dehaene 1997, ch. 1). In one experiment, 
wild rhesus monkeys looked longer during presentations that violated 
the laws of addition than during those that were consistent with those 
laws. Concretely, they recognized the discrepancy between the number of 
eggplants that were placed into a screened box (e.g., two) and the number 
of eggplants that were present once the screen was removed (e.g., one) 
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(Hauser 1996).21 Another foundation for judgment can be seen in Irene 
Pepperberg’s results with an African grey parrot, Alex (1999). When shown 
collections of objects that varied in shape, color, and material, Alex could 
answer not only simple questions such as “What color?” but also “How 
many red keys?” and even “What’s different?”
Third, there is even evidence of capacities that lay the foundation for 
inferential reasoning. Brendan McGonigle & Margaret Chalmers (1977) 
showed that squirrel monkeys could solve transitivity problems using 
five-member series. Taught to choose between adjacent pairs (a>b, b>c, 
&c.), they extend their preferences to non-adjacent pairs (e.g., a>c) which 
they had not been taught. Later pigeons and rats were also shown capable 
of doing so. This maps transitive inference (thence the name), but can 
be explained as a simple assignment of degrees of value—very desirable, 
somewhat desirable, better than nothing, etc. (Wynne 2004).
In determining the significance of these results, we must respect Lloyd 
Morgan’s Canon, the ethological application of Ockham’s Razor:22
In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher 
psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the exercise of one which stands 
lower in the psychological scale. (Morgan 1894, 53)
It forbids us from using the experiments mentioned above as evidence of 
conceptual thought in animals in the Thomistic sense of the word. We can 
distinguish the categories (not in the Aristotelian sense) which are within 
the reach of animals from concepts as follows:
21 Hauser acknowledged that the behavior of the monkeys might be explained by high-level 
perceptual, rather than arithmetic representations (“Perceptual representations [might] 
retain information about previously seen objects even when they become temporarily 
occluded and […] such representations may be rich enough to encode and distinguish 
between several such occluded objects at once.”), but even on the arithmetic explanation, 
the behavior does not require the abstraction of concepts—not of one or two and certainly 
not of addition, operation, or commutativity.
22 The application had already been made some two years before, by Wilhelm Wundt (1892, 
380; trans. 1912, 350): “recourse [may] be had to complex principles of explanation [only] 
when the simpler ones have proved inadequate.”
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a category […] is an ability merely to discriminate a certain thing, or kind, or 
property–for example, a colour, or shape–as opposed to a concept, which involves 
a richer ability, not only perhaps to make certain discriminations, but also to 
reason about the thing and its relations to other entities of similar or different 
appearance or function, for example, to infer that something is coloured and 
spatial from the fact that it is red. (Rey and Hauser 2005)
The cognition of categories suggests that evolutionary processes have 
brought animals some way towards the kind of complexity that is prerequisite 
to conceptual thought.
4.2. Their Location—I: What de Filippi & Mivart Require
On the question of where these two points are relative to one another, we 
can distinguish several possibilities.
The more fully evolutionary views posited by de Filippi and Mivart 
require that evolutionary processes be able to produce sense-powers at 
least complex enough to allow the abstraction of concepts. In other words, 
that abstraction needs no complexity beyond the reach of mutations and 
perhaps no more than would be useful to a brute animal. 
 21 
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example, a colour, or shape – as opposed to a concept, which involves a richer ability, not 
only perhaps to make certain discriminations, but also to reason about the thing and its 
relations to other entities of similar or different appearance or function, for example, to 
infer that something is coloured and spatial from the fact that it is red. (Rey and Hauser 
2005) 
 
The cognition of categories suggests that evolutionary processes have brought animals some 
way towards the kind of complexity that is prerequisite to conceptual thought. 
 
4.2. Their Location—I: What de Filippi & Mivart Require 
 
On the question of where these two points are relative to one another, we can distinguish several 
possibilities. 
The more fully evolutionary views posited by de Filippi and Mivart require that evolutionary 
processes be able to produce sense-powers at least complex enough to allow the abstraction of 
concepts. In other words, that abstraction needs no complexity beyond the reach of mutations and 
perhaps no more than would be useful to a brute animal.  
 
Jesuit entomologist Felix Rüschkamp (1939, 384–85) seems to have held this view: 
 
The difference between man and animal lies not in the bodily [Animalisch], but only in the 
mental [Geistig] [aspects of his nature]. Our mind [Verstand] requires, for the formation of 
abstract concepts, sense-perception and sensory centers [in the brain], but nothing different 
from what animals (as beings with sense powers only) [reine Sinneswesen] already have. 
Consequently, any creative intervention or patching up of the human body or brain would 
be superfluous. 
Jesuit entomologist Felix Rüschkamp (1939, 384–85) seems to have 
held this view:
The diff renc  betwe n m  and animal lies not in the b dily [Animalisch], 
but only in the m tal [Geistig] [aspects of his nature]. Our min  [Verstand] 
requires, for the forma ion of abstr ct concepts, sense-perception and sensory 
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centers [in the brain], but nothing different from what animals (as beings with 
sense powers only) [reine Sinneswesen] already have. Consequently, any creative 
intervention or patching up of the human body or brain would be superfluous.
Since that level of complexity is only necessary and not sufficient for rational 
thought, that would not be sufficient to show that rational beings (such as 
man) could have evolved by natural processes alone. Rational beings would 
appear only with the creation of rational souls capable of actually doing the 
abstraction that their evolutionarily formed brains made possible.
Would beings with that level of perceptual development in any sense 
require rational souls?23 Since the rational souls have to be created by God, 
the doctrine of Divine Freedom rules out anything like natural necessity 
here. There could, however, be a necessity of end.24
A rational soul might be necessary for individual survival if a mutation so 
changed an animal’s sensitive powers that the animal could no longer function 
well (or perhaps at all) unless it also had a rational soul capable of abstracting 
concepts from the images in its mind. Since human beings do, however, still 
have sense-powers on which we rely in a way seemingly not dependent on 
our awareness of concepts, this logical possibility does not seem promising.
Could such a soul be necessary in a weaker sense? A new degree of 
perceptual complexity might not be of much use if it were not supplemented 
by an intellect; it might produce too little advantage to be favored by 
natural (or sexual) selection. If, by contrast, the augmented sense-powers 
supplemented by rational powers did offer a selectable advantage, then the 
augmented powers might be selected in a way that would spread through 
23 Ludwig Lercher ([1940]; 1951, 296) raised this question in the third edition of his Institu-
tiones Theologicæ Dogmaticæ. (Lercher died in 1937; this posthumous edition was, accord-
ing to Motherway (1944, 217n4), revised by Franz Lakner.) He distinguished two versions 
of Catholic evolutionism—one according to which evolution made an animal body not 
only similar to a human one but organized in such a way as to require [exigit] the infusion 
of a rational soul and another, according to which evolution made an animal body only 
similar to a human one but not organized in such a way as to require the infusion of a ra-
tional soul, in which case the final modification of the human body would be the result of 
direct divine action. The sense of exigency central to his distinction seems not to be quite 
the same as the necessity in my own treatment of the idea.
24 For Aquinas distinction of three kinds of necessity, see 1273, 1a, 82.1.
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the population and thereby transform the entire species. So, the rational 
soul would be necessary for the spread of the new degree of perceptual 
complexity to the entire population.
Finally, an animal which had sensitive powers more developed than an 
animal would ever need, or could even use, in the course of an animal life might 
be able to live a full canine, simian, or cetacean life with its merely sensitive 
soul, but would have an untapped potential if it did not have a soul also capable 
of abstracting concepts from the images which its sensitive soul produced. 
The infusion of rational souls into such beings would be possible (in the way 
that would not be possible in the case of a plant) and fitting (in the sense 
that it would allow those animals to make a fuller use of their sense-powers). 
Such fittingness would not, however, in any sense require that God 
actually create a rational soul for every animal body developed enough 
to make such infusion possible. There might be reasons why God would 
choose not to do so. Perhaps it sufficed for God’s purposes that only some 
of the animals with cognitive capacities developed enough to permit the 
infusion of rational souls would be converted into rational animals, just 
as it evidently sufficed for his purposes that only some mammalian lines 
developed into dogs and dolphins, while others were condemned to develop 
only into donkeys and cats. My account of monogenesis (Kemp 2011) fits 
quite naturally with this idea of selective infusion.
It is also possible, of course, that mutations and selection could take 
a species beyond the minimum amount of complexity necessary for abstrac-
tion, or even that it has done so.
 23 
possible in the case of a plant) and fitting (in the sense that it would allow those animals to make 
a fuller use of their sense-powers).  
Such fittingness would not, however, in any sense require that God actually create a rational 
soul for every animal body developed enough to make such infusion possible. There might be 
reasons why God would choose not to do so. Perhaps it sufficed for God’s purposes that only some 
of the animals with cognitive capacities developed enough to permit the infusion of rational souls 
would be converted into rational animals, just as it evidently sufficed for his purposes that only 
some mammalian lines developed into dogs and dolphins, while others were condemned to 
develop only into donkeys and cats. My account of monogenesis (Kemp 2011) fits quite naturally 
with this idea of selective infusion. 
 
It is also possible, of course, that mutations and selection could take a species beyond the 
minimum amount of complexity necessary for abstraction, or even that it has done so. 
 
 
This possibility raises a few other questions. 
Question 1: Have any brute animals that have ever existed had sense-powers sufficiently 
complex to allow the abstraction of concepts, even though none have the rational soul necessary 
to effect such an abstraction? Mivart added to the characterization mentioned above, “… to a 
degree much greater than any other animal with which we were before acquainted,” but was he 
correct? Could God have given dogs, apes, dolphins, or parrots, as they now exist, rational souls? 
Is it just a contingent fact that He did not actually do so?  
Question 2: Are there, beyond the minimum level of complexity sufficient for concept-
abstraction, degrees of increasing complexity that can be correlated with levels of intellection? 
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This possibility raises a few other questions.
Question 1: Have any brute animals that have ever existed had 
sense-powers sufficiently complex to allow the abstraction of concepts, 
even though none have the rational soul necessary to effect such an ab-
straction? Mivart added to the characterization mentioned above, “[…] to 
a degree much greater than any other animal with which we were before 
acquainted,” but was he correct? Could God have given dogs, apes, dolphins, 
or parrots, as they now exist, rational souls? Is it just a contingent fact that 
He did not actually do so? 
Question 2: Are there, beyond the minimum level of complexity suf-
ficient for concept-abstraction, degrees of increasing complexity that can 
be correlated with levels of intellection? The alternative would be that, 
once the aggregations of images reached a certain degree of complexity 
and coherence, no greater degree would enhance the power of abstraction.
The answers to these questions, interesting as they might be, would not 
affect the resolution to the more fundamental question being asked here.
4.3. Their Location—II: What is Enough for Wallace & González
Perhaps, however, evolutionary processes cannot get to the minimum level of 
complexity necessary for abstraction of concepts, leaving the gap between 
animal and man unbridgeable by evolutionary processes, in which case the 
proper diagram would be this:
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complexity and coherence, no greater degree would enha ce the power of abstraction. 
The answers to these questions, interesting as they might be, would not affect the resolution to 
the more fundamental question being asked here. 
 
4.3. Their Location—II: What is Enough for Wallace & González 
 
Perhaps, however, evolutionary processes cannot get to the minimum level of complexity 
necessary for abstraction of concepts, leaving the gap between animal and man unbridgeable by 
evolutionary processes, in which case the proper diagram would be this: 
 
 
If that gap exists, divine intervention of the kind Wallace and González suggested would be 
one way that it could be crossed. Something like this view was defended in the 1930’s by Ernest 
Messenger (1930, 276–280) and by Pierre Marie Périer (1938, 232–39). 
It is hard to see how there could be any scientific arguments against the idea that direct divine 
action played some role in the formation of Adam’s body. There is no evidence on the question of 
what in fact caused any particular past mutation. Whether God caused it directly, or whether He 
caused it indirectly (by causing radiation to effect it), or whether it was caused by fully natural 
processes is a question the data to answer which we will never have. 
 
5. The Two Catholic Accounts & the Interbreeding Hypothesis 
 
What connection do these ideas have with my earlier paper on monogenesis (Kemp 2011)? Are 
both of the versions of Catholic evolutionism discussed above compatible with the Interbreeding 
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If that gap exists, divine intervention of the kind Wallace and González 
suggested would be one way that it could be crossed. Such intervention was 
defended by Juan González Arintero (1898, 188–191), by Ernest Messenger 
(1930, 276–280), and by Pierre Marie Périer (1938, 232–39).
It is hard to see how there could be any scientific arguments against 
the idea that direct divine action played some role in the formation of 
Adam’s body. There is no evidence on the question of what in fact caused 
any particular past mutation. Whether God caused it directly, or whether 
He caused it indirectly (by causing radiation to effect it), or whether it was 
caused by fully natural processes is a question the data to answer which 
we will never have.
5. The Two Catholic Accounts & the Interbreeding Hypothesis
What connection do these ideas have with my earlier paper on monogenesis 
(Kemp 2011)? Are both of the versions of Catholic evolutionism discussed 
above compatible with the Interbreeding Hypothesis which I proposed a few 
years ago? The deFilippi-Mivart family of views clearly is so. It was the kind 
of evolutionism which I had in mind. Are my earlier ideas also compatible 
with the Wallace-González version?
It might seem that they are not. The formation in question would 
presumably have to be more than just the formation of Adam’s own body. 
It must have an effect that would be transmitted to all of his fully human 
descendants as well. All fully human beings, that is to say, would, on the 
simplest hypothesis, have to be genetic descendants of Adam (carrying, that is 
to say, the genes that were the product of the divine intervention), not merely 
his genealogical descendants. In other words, it would not be enough that all 
fully human beings have Adam in their family tree, they would also have to 
have the crucial genes in their personal genome.25 Genetic descendants are 
merely a subset of genealogical descendants. Universal genetic ancestry could 
25 On a more complex alternative, the divinely produced mutation might subsequently be 
supplemented by a naturally produced mutation that first duplicated the work of the di-
vinely produced mutation and then replaced it.
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not be achieved as quickly as can universal genealogical ancestry. Either 
of two factors could, however, make the spread of the crucial genes to all 
humanity, even to the isolated populations living at the ends of the earth, 
sufficiently rapid to meet all theological, scientific, and historical concerns.26 
The first such factor is that rationality might be sufficiently favored by 
natural or sexual selection to spread fairly rapidly through populations of 
reproductively human beings. The second is that the first rational beings 
might have lived so long ago that even a more slowly-spreading mutation 
could have reached all reproductively human beings long enough ago to 
obviate this problem. There may be no reason to posit direct divine action 
in the formation of Adam’s body, but the fact of such action, if fact it be, 
would not undermine the Interbreeding Hypothesis on which I relied to 
meet the objection to monogenesis on the basis of human genetic diversity.
6. Eve
Let me conclude with some remarks about the body of Eve. There are three 
reasons why this matter requires separate attention.
First, of course, the narrative of Genesis distinguishes Adam (formed 
from dust) from Eve (formed from the rib— הצלע haṣṣêlā‘—of Adam). The 
Pontifical Biblical Commission, in its statement of 1909, handled the two 
cases slightly differently: “Whether in particular the literal historical 
sense can be called into question where it is a matter of facts (presented 
in those chapters) pertaining to the foundation of the Christian religion; 
for example, […] the distinctive creation of man [and] the formation of 
the first woman from the first man […] —It cannot.” In what way was “the 
formation of the first woman from the first man” a “fact […] pertaining to 
the foundation of the Christian religion”? St. Thomas (1273, 1a, 92.2) gave 
four reasons. Here are two: “In order thus to give the first man a certain 
dignity consisting in this, that as God is the principle of the whole universe, 
so the first man, in likeness to God, was the principle of the whole human 
26 On this, see the first chapters of Swamidass (2019).
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race,” and, a sacramental reason, “by this is signified that the Church takes 
her origin from Christ.”
Second, some Catholic anti-evolutionist theologians have tried to use 
the thesis of divine action in the formation of the body of Eve as a kind of 
Archimedean point against the hypothesis of the evolutionary origin of the 
body even of Adam. Gerard Van Noort, for example, wrote that “No thoughtful 
person thinks that, the body of Adam having been formed by evolution, the 
body of Eve was not” (1912, 115). He was wrong. Some thoughtful people, 
including leading Catholic evolutionists such as Henry de Dorlodot (2009, 
159–179) and E. C. Messenger (1932, 252–273), thought just that. Perhaps 
Van Noort just meant that they should not have done so.
How did those evolutionists handle a third, largely scientific, concern? 
The infusion of rational souls into two individuals out of a population 
of prehuman beings would not be sufficient to address the theological 
concerns of the Pontifical Biblical Commission. Neither natural mutation 
in two individuals,27 nor even divine modification of those two would yield 
quite the dependence of Eve’s body on Adam’s indicated above. Messenger, 
in particular, wrestled with the search for some natural process that would 
involve such dependence, but in the end noted that “this difficulty did not 
hinder the Fathers or the ancient doctors and theologians, except Cajetan, 
from accepting the doctrine” (1932, 273).
That God would use extra-natural processes when necessary to achieve 
his theological ends, while in other cases relying on the natural powers of 
beings which He had already made, can be established on other grounds. 
That He who did so at Cana might also have done so in Eden is not so very 
improbable. That He used Adam’s rib is surely not impossible. That detail 
might, however, be needlessly offensive to scientific ears. So as a matter of 
delicacy, let me suggest an alternative not at all far removed from Scripture 
27 Any account which relies exclusively on a genetic difference between Adam and Eve, on 
the one hand, and the other individuals in the species from which they evolved will face, 
in addition, this trilemma. If the genetic mutation underlying the difference occurred 
less than twice, then Adam and Eve did not share it. If it occurred more than twice, then 
there are human beings who are not their descendants. That natural processes produced 
it exactly twice seems improbable. It is not, to be sure, impossible.
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and not forcing any revision of the theological doctrines connected to the 
passage in question.
First, what exactly does הצלע haṣṣêlā‘ mean? Is it exactly a rib? Or is it 
just something taken from Adam’s side? Could it be a small strand of DNA 
transplanted from Adam into Eve at the moment of her conception? There 
being no word for DNA in Biblical Hebrew, how would that fact have been 
revealed to the author of Genesis or transmitted to its readers? Maybe הצלע 
would seem to be as good a choice as any. This strand would not have to be 
the genetic marker of humanity and would not have to be passed on to all 
of the human descendants of Adam and Eve. The conservative theological 
requirement is only that Eve have been formed from the body of Adam and 
everyone else genealogically descended from them. No one thinks that Eve 
passed on the transplanted rib, so there is no reason to think that she passed 
on to all (or even any) of her descendants the transplanted genes either.
Conclusion
There is no reason to think that evolutionary processes cannot reach a level 
of perceptual complexity sufficient to allow the abstraction of concepts. It is 
not necessary to think that the construction of the body of a rational animal 
must begin from scratch. Animal behavior does show a modest ability to 
“collect, group, and preserve sensible images of objects, but it does go far 
enough ” in the direction of “complex and coherent aggregations” to make 
plausible the idea that bodies with perceptual powers equivalent to those 
found in man might have been formed by purely evolutionary processes.
The principles of Christian naturalism articulated by Henry de Dorlodot 
(1921, 108 and 115; 1925, 87 and 93–94) a century ago suggest a presump-
tion in favor of the natural evolution of the body of Adam, but even if the 
full attainment of the required level of complexity is beyond the reach of 
evolutionary processes, surely the product of those processes is close enough 
to allow completion by modest divine supplementary modification of an 
animal that is itself the product of evolution.
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vol. 1: L’Origine des espèces. Brussels: Vromant. Translation: 1925. Darwinism 
and Catholic Thought by Ernest C. Messenger. New York: Benziger.
De Dorlodot, Henry. 2009. L’Origine de l’homme. Brussels: Mardaga.
8(2)/2020170
K E N N E T H W. K E M P
De Filippi, Filippo. 1864. “L’Uomo e le scimie.” Il Politecnico: Repertorio mensile di 
studj applicati alla prosperità e coltura sociale 21:5–32. 
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